CIJR
Canadian Institute for Jewish Research

Prof. Frederick Krantz, Director

PALESTINIANS AT CROSSROADS
Ehud Ya’ari
Jerusalem Report, October 28, 2008

“What Palestinians must be prepared to undertake is nothing less than a final and conclusive strategic battle with . Palestinians should not be deterred by the past, but should look with confidence to the future. The… Palestinians have more strategic cards than they think—and has fewer. Over the longer term Israeli military power is of limited use—and will even be a liability—if we learn how to play our cards properly. No political arrangement based on force alone endures. is wrong to think that the longer the game goes on the more strategic opportunities it will have. It is the other way round…”

These plain words conclude the 60-page document entitled, “Regaining the Initiative—Palestinian Strategic Options to End Israeli Occupation,” which was published in August after a series of workshops attended by Palestinians from both inside and outside the territories. The workshops were convened by the Oxford Research Group and were made possible by a grant from the European Union. The 30-some participants, mostly Fatah supporters, included former Palestinian Authority ministers, prominent academics and members of think tanks.

 The aim of the project was to find a way for the Palestinians to adopt a different strategy following the anticipated collapse of the “Annapolis Process.” One by one, the options open to both sides after the failure of the attempt to reach a permanent solution were analyzed. could try to prolong the negotiations, to set up a provisional Palestinian state within shrunken borders, to carry out further unilateral withdrawals from large areas of the West Bank, or to tempt and to take responsibility. The Palestinians would reject each one of these out of hand. Moreover, the authors of the document believe, the Palestinians are capable of “blocking” all of these ostensible options.

The essence of the operational plan presented in the document is that the Palestinians will threaten a “reversal” of the negotiating option, to which they have adhered since 1988, including the annulment of their recognition of . In addition, they suggest that it would be necessary to reconstitute the Palestinian Authority so that instead of fulfilling the role of “protecting from bearing its full burden of the costs of Occupation” it would become “a Palestinian Resistance Authority.” This implies a threat of “smart resistance” and intifada, which would have to be based on a compromise between Fatah and Hamas. The objective would be “to maximize the cost of continuing occupation for ”—or, in other words, generate a combination of terror and various forms of civil resistance.…

Another document released in recent days was issued by the Israeli-Palestinian IPCRI center in Jerusalem . In it, Joe DeVoir, a young academic, sums up discussions and interviews with a variety of personages in the Palestinian territories. He also examines the various options, including that of a Palestinian switch toward a demand for a one-state solution and all that it entails. The document recommends that the Palestinians should switch to conducting a policy that is termed “a tightly coordinated non-violent campaign” for achieving a statehood. IPCRI intends in the near future to expound more broadly exactly how such a campaign should be conducted.

 The various options ostensibly open to the Palestinians, including sticking to the tahadiah (the truce between Israel and Hamas in Gaza) and its extension to the West Bank or a unilateral declaration of independence are also scrutinized in yet another paper, based on workshops attended by Palestinian intellectuals, held in East Jerusalem hotels this past summer and summed up by the Palestinian “Bringing Peace Together” initiative, headed by Walid Salem. The conclusions were formulated by a reputable journalist, Ata Qaymari. “The Palestinians are split, weak and defeated… Neither the Arab League nor the international community is willing to make real sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinians (i.e., sending troops to Gaza to fight Hamas)… The Palestinians should lower their expectations of the outcome of the official negotiating process and instead pursue more realistic goals. The best option will be to work to solve the dispute by bridging the internal right between Fatah and Hamas… and then agree to pursue temporary agreements… that would place Palestinians on an equal footing with others, even if a state does not fulfill all of Palestinian territorial ambitions.” What this means is a search for an interim arrangement, something like a state with provisional borders, a deal of less than peace which does not amount to a permanent settlement.

The three documents illustrate the great efforts and jostling that is under way on the other side, the agonizing over choosing between an intifada the likes of which we have not yet seen, with the government standing openly behind it, or striving for some partial settlement. True, at the moment, this is mainly a discourse among intellectuals, but I believe it reflects just how sensitive—and explosive—the current mood in the territories is. Anyone who thinks the status quo can continue for many years is deluding himself.

As an incidental remark, one may perhaps venture to say that the discussion regarding the next stage in the road is now more serious, more thoughtful and more substantial among the Palestinians than it is among the Israelis. For example, one of the Palestinians’ more prominent thinkers, Ahmed Khalidi of London, a man well-connected to the PA upper echelon, has recently explained in a lecture at Georgetown University that the main interest of the Palestinian national movement is independence, and not necessarily sovereignty, so that the end of the occupation is not necessarily the corridor to statehood.… To Israeli ears, distinguishing between independence and sovereignty sounds vague and unfeasible, but this is not so for the other side. There, the intellectuals—though not yet the politicians—are already discussing how to shape the values and the slogans for the post Olmert-Abu Mazen era.

We must therefore bear well in mind that a “Palestinian Resistance Authority,” a “nonviolent campaign,” an “upgrading of status” and “independence without sovereignty” are concepts with which we will have to contend in the near future.